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1011 
Revisiting the Work We Know  
So Little About: Race, Wealth,  
Privilege, and Social Justice 
Stephanie M. Wildman,* Margalynne Armstrong,**  
and Beverly Moran*** 
In his article, The Work We Know So Little About,1 Gerald López introduces 
Maria Elena, a housekeeper, mother, tutor, seamstress, and cook. He connects her 
daily life struggles to make ends meet, to care for her family, and to survive with 
the issue of social justice for all members of society. He underlines the gap 
between such clients and legal education, which does so little to help students 
learn about the Maria Elenas of our community, what these clients would seek in a 
lawyer, or even how these clients might find a lawyer. Lawyers and law seem 
irrelevant when viewed from Maria Elena’s perspective. Low-income women of 
color have developed their own survival mechanisms without much thanks to 
law.2 While some lawyers do connect to these clients, López observes that this 
contact occurs in spite of, not because of, legal education.3 
López says the miracle is that attorney-client relationships happen at all and 
are less than dysfunctional.4 López describes the many obstacles faced by clients 
who, like Maria Elena, often opt for more informal solutions for problems rather 
than engaging the legal system.5 When these clients do make contact with lawyers, 
 
* Copyright © 2012 by Stephanie M. Wildman, Professor of Law and Director, Center for Social 
Justice and Public Service, Santa Clara University. This Essay evolved from a talk at the March 2011 
Irvine symposium Searching for Equality, and reflects work done with Beverly Moran on race and 
wealth disparities and with Margalynne Armstrong on teaching and learning about race, especially 
whiteness. Special thanks to Ellen Platt, research librarian extraordinaire; to Fanny Chu, for being an 
outstanding research assistant and for providing key language in the section on the Occupy Wall 
Street material; to Patrick Hensleigh for excellent research help; to Trina Jones for organizing the 
symposium; and to Leanna Costantini for thoughtful edits. Thank you to the Santa Clara School of 
Law Faculty Scholarship Support Fund. 
** Associate Professor of Law and Associate Academic Director, Center for Social Justice and Public 
Service, Santa Clara University. 
*** Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. 
1. Gerald P. López, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
2. Id. at 8. 
3. Id. at 9–10. 
4. Id. at 9. 
5. Id. at 8.  
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these attorney-client relations, across race, economic class, and other multiple-
identity categories that radiate forms of privilege, represent a “magnificent mutual 
adaptation” according to López.6 López believes that “fighting political and social 
subordination” is the work we know so little about.7 
When I [Stephanie] teach López’s article, I ask my students two questions: 
“If López is right and fighting subordination is the work we know so little about, 
does that work require knowledge that can be taught and learned?” and “Why 
might it be difficult for lawyers or law students to connect with the Maria Elenas 
in our communities?” 
Of course the answers implicate education, particularly legal education and 
its role in keeping systems of privilege unspoken, unidentified, and unexamined. 
And the answers underline the need for each of us to pursue an education about 
systems of privilege ourselves. Work against subordination does require 
knowledge—in fact many kinds of knowledge. Provocateurs for social justice8 
must learn self-awareness of their own privileges and limitations as well as a sense 
of the role that systems of privilege play in the social order. 
This Essay considers why privilege—with a particular emphasis on white 
racial privilege and socioeconomic wealth—is so hard for the holder of the 
privilege to see. Individual holders of privilege—perhaps you, the reader of this 
Essay—possess multiple privileges, even as you might be on the unprivileged side 
of the “power line”9 with respect to certain identity categories. Those situated 
above the power line share privileged characteristics that define societal norms.10 
“[P]rivileged group members can rely on their privilege and avoid objecting to 
oppression,” giving them the significant benefit of opting for silence when facing 
examples of subordination impacting others.11 The normalization of privilege as 
the ordinary societal order makes the privilege hard for its holder to separate from 
“just the way things are.”12 
Most Americans believe in a legal system that aspires to, and often achieves, 
neutrality in matters of class and equality in matters of race.13 They do not view 
 
6. Id. at 9. 
7. Id. at 9–10. 
8. Jane Aiken uses this phrase in her essay, Jane H. Aiken, Provocateurs for Justice, 7 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 287 (2001) (describing the education process to make her students “justice ready”). 
Provocateurs for justice desire to make change toward greater social justice. 
9. STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY MARGALYNNE ARMSTRONG, 
ADRIENNE D. DAVIS, & TRINA GRILLO, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE 
UNDERMINES AMERICA 29 (1996) (explaining Frances Ansley’s use of a power line to delineate 
privileged attributes from those that are not privileged, across culturally significant identity categories 
like race, gender, and sexual orientation). 
10. Id. at 13. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 13–14; see also Beverly I. Moran, Quantum Leap: A Black Woman Uses Legal Education  
to Obtain Her Honorary White Pass, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 118 (1991). 
13. See, e.g., Terry Carter, Divided Justice, 85 A.B.A. J. 42, 43 (1999) (reporting that 80.7% of 
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law and the legal system as one way that American society polices and enforces 
race and wealth disparities. Rather, because of the prevalent view that American 
law and legal institutions are class and colorblind, most of those working within 
law see no place for considerations of race and wealth disparities in their 
education or practice.  
Ironically, neutrality and equality can support subordination and hierarchy. 
French writer Anatole France illustrated this point when he sarcastically applauded 
the majestic equalitarianism of the law, which “forbids the rich as well as the poor 
to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.”14 
Echoing France’s sentiment, legal realist Robert Hale wrote in 1943 about 
the law’s role in creating unequal bargaining relationships and unequal wealth 
effects.15 Hale explained that wealth gives its owner control over his or her own 
life and leisure and over other people’s lives as well.16 Hale illustrated this control 
of the wealthy over the working classes by describing the greater bargaining power 
that capital has over labor, especially low-skilled workers.17 This unequal 
bargaining power leads to inequitable distributions of wealth as those with control 
over capital can extract work from others without providing just compensation.18 
As seen in Hale’s article, legal neutrality claims that law has no effect on this 
wealth distribution.19 Instead, law simply protects property rights and freedom of 
contract.20 Under this concept of legal neutrality, institutions other than the law, 
such as the market, fuel the wealth distribution occasioned by unequal bargaining 
power.  
Hale rejected the claim that legal neutrality has no wealth effects. Rather, 
Hale pointed out that legal rules lead to particular wealth distribution patterns and 
that different legal rules create different wealth distribution patterns while still 
protecting property rights and freedom of contract.21 For Hale, the allegedly 
neutral system of American property and inheritance laws does more than merely 
 
white attorneys and 59.1% of Black attorneys polled were “hopeful” that the justice system would 
eliminate racial bias). Other versions of material discussed infra text accompanying notes 13 through 
37 appear in Beverly Moran & Stephanie M. Wildman, Race and Wealth Disparity: The Role of Law and  
the Legal System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1219 (2007), and in RACE AND WEALTH DISPARITIES: A 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY DISCOURSE (Beverly Moran ed., 2008). 
14. ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYS ROUGE [THE RED LILY] (1894), as reprinted in JOHN 
BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 655 (1980). 
15. Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943). 
16. Id. at 626–28. 
17. Id. at 626–27. 
18. Id. at 627–28. 
19. Id. at 626. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 627–28 (“Bargaining power would be different were it not that the law endows some 
with rights that are more advantageous than those with which it endows others.”). 
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protect private property and freedom of contract; these laws also give property 
owners power over workers to the detriment of most Americans.22 
Most people are aware of the failures of the post-Civil War Reconstruction23 
and the emergence of the Jim Crow system of segregation.24 Few are as aware of 
how the liberal New Deal tied race and wealth together. The New Deal introduced 
the notion of an economic safety net into American politics, and as a result, pulled 
many Americans out of poverty. But the New Deal also excluded agricultural and 
domestic workers from that economic safety net because those occupations 
served as a “neutral” proxy for race.25 After World War II, the government 
continued to enrich its citizens based on race through the Federal Housing 
Administration, which made home ownership available to working class whites, 
while excluding Black buyers through redlining and other exclusionary practices.26 
These seemingly race-neutral rules actually shifted wealth away from Blacks and 
towards whites.  
Wealth disparities and race both play marginal roles in the law school 
curriculum.27 Although all first year law students study subjects that involve issues 
 
22. Id. 
23. Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 1923, 1931–33 (2000). 
24. Id. at 1962–66. 
25. See MARTHA R. MAHONEY, JOHN O. CALMORE & STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, SOCIAL 
JUSTICE: PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LAW 451–571 (2003) (discussing livelihood and  
the economic safety net). See generally IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: 
AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2005) 
(reporting how U.S. social programs favored whites); William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: 
A History, Critique, and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1835–38 (2001); Joel F. Handler, 
“Constructing the Political Spectacle”: The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social 
Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899, 912–20 (1990). 
26. For more on the private and public practices that operated to deny Black Americans home 
ownership, see generally William J. Collins & Robert A. Margo, Racial Differences in Wealth: A Brief 
Historical Overview, in RACE AND WEALTH DISPARITIES, supra note 13, at 23, 23–40, and M. Elizabeth 
Kirkland & Sheila R. Peters, “Location, Location, Location”: Residential Segregation and Wealth Disparity,  
in RACE AND WEALTH DISPARITIES, supra note 13, at 11, 11–22. See also SHERYLL CASHIN,  
THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN 
DREAM (2004); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. 
SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 
(1995); Margalynne Armstrong, Race and Property Values in Entrenched Segregation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1051 (1998); Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659 
(1995); Florence Wagman Roisman, Teaching About Inequality, Race, and Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
665 (2002). 
27. Class in America, according to bell hooks, is the subject the culture does not address. 
“Nowadays it is fashionable to talk about race or gender; the uncool subject is class.” BELL HOOKS, 
WHERE WE STAND: CLASS MATTERS, at vii (2000) (grieving that greed sets “the standard for how we 
live and interact in everyday life”). Her comment is reminiscent of Patricia J. Williams’s description of 
race as the elephant in the room that gets tiptoed around and is not discussed. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, 
THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 49 (1991). Although both wealth and race tend to be ignored 
in law school classrooms, several good casebooks are available on these subjects, including DERRICK 
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of wealth and race, legal educators rarely teach those subjects in ways that raise or 
highlight those concerns. Instead, legal pedagogy adopts a mode of 
“perspectivelessness,” as Kimberlé Crenshaw has pointed out, reinforcing the 
ideal that legal discourse is objective and analytical.28 Perspectivelessness supports 
the myth of legal neutrality.29 Although legal scholars like Hale have been very 
explicit about the role of wealth in American law30 and critical race theory has 
been equally explicit about the role race plays in American legal institutions,31 both 
topics remain relegated to boutique seminar courses. Students can, and often do, 
study law for three years without ever considering either wealth or race as 
legitimate topics of study.32  
We all have a stake in changing this omission. Students and faculty of color 
should not be the only ones to care about race, nor should they shoulder the 
primary responsibility for educating white colleagues, who also have a race, about 
the role of race and socioeconomic wealth in society. As colorblindness has 
emerged as a dominant aspiration in our society, conversation about race has 
become even more difficult.33 People of color know that society racializes them 
 
BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (6th ed. 2008), EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. 
HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER, IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS (2005), and JUAN F. 
PEREA, RICHARD DELGADO, ANGELA P. HARRIS, JEAN STEFANCIC & STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, 
RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (2d ed. 2007). 
28. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education,  
4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 33, 35 (1994). The above citation refers to the article as 
reproduced by the Southern California Review of Law and Women’s Studies as part of its 1994 symposium 
entitled “Bringing Values and Perspectives Back into the Law School Classroom: Practical Ideas for 
Teachers.” Professor Crenshaw originally wrote this article as a foreword to an issue of the National 
Black Law Journal. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Towards a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal 
Education, 11 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1 (1989). 
29. Perspectivelessness suggests that legal discourse properly excludes any culturally specific 
or experiential knowledge. Crenshaw, supra note 28, at 39. As Crenshaw suggests, it masks the 
existence of a dominant perspective, supra note 28, at 40, thus supporting the myth of legal neutrality. 
30. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?,  
56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 20 (2005) (supporting the idea that the Nixon appointments to the Supreme 
Court removed the potential for a progressive understanding of wealth distribution); see also Hale, 
supra note 15, at 626. 
31. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean 
Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE 
MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). 
32. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007). 
33. Most identify Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson with the concept of 
colorblindness. In that dissent Harlan chastised the separate but equal doctrine and proclaimed, “Our 
constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil 
rights, all citizens are equal before the law.” Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). Thus, the notion of colorblindness resonates with themes of racial equality and justice. 
Prior to Plessy, supporters of civil rights for people of color argued that the Fourteenth Amendment 
established the principle that citizenship was a national entitlement and that government could no 
longer make distinctions among citizens based on their color. MARK ELLIOTT, COLOR-BLIND 
JUSTICE: ALBION TOURGÉE AND THE QUEST FOR RACIAL EQUALITY FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO 
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with a race other than white. Yet whites often do not think about race, except 
when they notice people of color as having a race. Whites tend not to notice that 
they too have a race that carries social meaning and generally positive 
presumptions. Whites often aspire to colorblindness, believing that it promotes 
equality. However, they fail to see how their whiteness privileges them in so many 
societal interactions—from making purchases in a store without being asked for 
identification to entering a hospital for visiting hours without being stopped.34 The 
myth that everyone can work hard and become a millionaire further veils the 
social stratification and the dynamic of class creation.35  
Sixty years after Hale wrote about how law makes choices about what to 
protect, labor economist Stephen J. Rose depicted, in a book and poster, the 
interrelationships of income, wealth, occupation, race, gender, and household 
type.36 The book reports that only five percent of the United States population 
owns nearly sixty percent of the nation’s wealth.37 Using an icon representing 
190,000 people as its primary unit, Rose created a poster approximately two feet 
wide and three feet tall. The left side of the poster shows the American population 
by annual income up to $150,000. Ninety-two percent of the American population 
earns at or below $150,000 in combined household income. All ninety-two 
percent fit within the physical frame of the three-foot tall poster. 
To include people who earn combined annual incomes of up to $300,000 
and maintain the 190,000-per-icon scale, the poster’s height must increase to eight 
feet. To reflect the 20,000 households with more than $10 million in yearly 
 
PLESSY V. FERGUSON 250 (2006). The contemporary colorblindness doctrine revives the call for 
equal treatment under the law but does not acknowledge or remedy continuing inequality attributable 
to decades of legally sanctioned racial discrimination. As Neil Gotanda has observed, a colorblind 
perspective characterizes race as “objective and apolitical.” Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our 
Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 34 (1991). Further, and seemingly at odds with its 
goals, a colorblind perspective divorces race from historical realities of minority, particularly Black, 
oppression. Id. at 6–7, 37. This “unconnectedness,” as Gotanda describes it, perceives modern 
manifestations of that historical oppression as isolated phenomena, rather than symptoms of the 
complex and systemic issue of race. Id. at 44–45. Thus, proponents of colorblindness “live in an 
ideological world where racial subordination is ubiquitous yet disregarded—unless it takes the form of 
individual, intended, and irrational prejudice.” Id. at 46; see also Stephanie M. Wildman, The Persistence of 
White Privilege, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 245, 251 (2005) (identifying a “contemporary cultural push 
to colorblindness”). 
34. For a particularized and extensive itemization of white privileges, see Peggy McIntosh, 
White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in 
Women’s Studies, in POWER, PRIVILEGE, AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 22 (Leslie Bender & 
Daan Braveman eds., 1995). See also Stephanie M. Wildman, Reflections on Whiteness and Latina/o Critical 
Theory, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 307 (1997) (detailing how white privilege adversely affects 
Latinas/os). 
35. See generally Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest, and the Anti-
Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799 (2003) [hereinafter Mahoney, Class and Status]. 
36. STEPHEN J. ROSE, SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES: THE NEW 
AMERICAN PROFILE POSTER (2007). 
37. Id. at 34. 
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income, again maintaining the same scale, the poster must grow to twenty stories 
high. That difference from three feet to twenty stories, coupled with the 
population density in the bottom three feet, illustrates the unlikelihood of an 
individual moving from the chart’s bottom to its top. Yet, in the United States, we 
believe that anyone can climb those twenty stories in one lifetime. This belief 
coexists with public rules and private practices that have tied wealth to race for 
generations.38 As a result, nonwhites are even less likely to move out of poverty 
than whites. 
In March 2011, the UC Irvine School of Law convened a symposium, 
Searching for Equality: A Conference on Law, Race & Socio-Economic Class. The 
symposium provided a forum to recognize the income distribution disparities 
portrayed by Rose’s poster and book and to acknowledge the prevalence of “rags 
to riches fairytales” in spite of this hard evidence. The symposium premise further 
acknowledged: “[P]eople of color are much more likely than their White 
counterparts to be impoverished, to have lower incomes, to be incarcerated, and 
to be uninsured and unemployed.”39 Symposium participants examined the 
interplay between race and class in a number of substantive areas.  
In the months since the symposium convened, the Occupy Wall Street 
movement took hold in cities across the United States. The movement originated 
with an initial demonstration held in New York’s financial district during 
September 2011.40 Claiming no goals but raising awareness of economic inequities 
and aiming to expose how “the richest 1% of people are writing the rules of an 
unfair global economy,”41 the movement has spread both online42 and offline to 
multiple cities across the nation. Although support and momentum have 
fluctuated, Occupy Wall Street has already made a strong impact in the public 
consciousness: “It altered political discourse, forced debate away from the deficit 
 
38. See generally OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 26 (examining patterned disparities between 
Black and white communities’ living standards, access to opportunity, and command over resources 
in light of public laws and resulting private practices from Reconstruction through the New Deal and 
civil rights era up to contemporary America). See also TIM WISE, DEAR WHITE AMERICA: LETTER TO 
A NEW MINORITY 112–42 (2012) (examining the same policies, including a brief discussion 
concerning the impact of the recent housing crisis). 
39. Searching for Equality: A Conference on Law, Race & Socio-Economic Class, UCI LAW, 
http://www.law.uci.edu/law-race-class_March2011.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2012). 
40. Occupy Movement (Occupy Wall Street), N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/ 
reference/timestopics/organizations/o/occupy_wall_street/index.html (last updated Sept. 17, 2012) 
(“The Occupy Movement began on Sept. 17, 2011, when a diffuse group of activists began a loosely 
organized protest called Occupy Wall Street, encamping in Zuccotti Park, a privately owned park in 
New York’s financial district.”). 
41. About Us, OCCUPYWALLST., http://occupywallst.org/about (last visited Aug. 10, 2012). 
42. Jennifer Preston, Wall Street Protest Spurs Online Dialogue on Inequity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 
2011, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/nyregion/wall-street-protest-spurs-
online-conversation.html (“These Occupy pages around the country are being used not only to echo 
the issues being discussed in New York about jobs, corporate greed and budget cuts, but also to talk 
about other problems closer to home.”). 
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towards inequality and, via a series of high-profile actions, marches and—most 
dramatically—clashes with police, shot up the news agenda worldwide.”43 
Noticing economic inequality in the United States is a bit like Captain Louis 
Renault in Casablanca saying, “I’m shocked, shocked to learn there is gambling 
going on in here,” as he collects the winnings from his last wager.44 But, as the 
Occupy movement has highlighted, the vast economic disparity between the 
wealthiest one percent of Americans and the rest of the nation bears notice.45 
Union leaders have started lending their support, adopting some of the Occupy 
movement’s rhetoric and social media tactics because they were so impressed with 
how the protesters have brought these issues into the public consciousness.46 
As this Essay goes to press, it remains to be seen whether the Occupy 
movement’s “discovery” of economic disparity within American capitalism will 
yield any meaningful social change. Pure focus on socioeconomic class, without 
attention to other systems of privilege, seems an unlikely formula for success. Yet 
again, unexamined attitudes make it hard to consider race along with 
socioeconomic class as part of the struggle for social justice.47  
Whites may fear that talking about race makes them seem racist.48 But it 
 
43. Karen McVeigh, Occupy Movement Plans Spring Offensive as Momentum Stalls, GUARDIAN 
(U.K.) (Nov. 11, 2011, 11:28 EST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/11/occupy-
movement-winter-what-next. 
44. CASABLANCA (Warner Brothers Pictures 1942). 
45. Nicholas D. Kristof, Occupy the Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at SR11, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/opinion/sunday/kristof-occupy-the-agenda.html (“The top 1 
percent of Americans possess a greater net worth than the entire bottom 90 percent, according to an 
analysis by the Economic Policy Institute.”). 
46. Steven Greenhouse, Standing Arm in Arm: Occupy Movement Inspires Unions to Embrace Bold 
Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/09/business/ 
occupy-movement-inspires-unions-to-embrace-bold-tactics.html. 
47. Several scholars offer a compelling example of the power of joining attention to race 
within a socioeconomic class-based protest. At the end of 1995, the predominantly Black labor force 
at the Greensboro, North Carolina K-Mart distribution center earned an average of $5.10 per hour 
less than workers in identical jobs at other locations. The workers had complained for years of racial 
and sexual harassment, unsafe working conditions, and low wages. The union won a contract, 
marking the first time a K-Mart center was organized, yet K-Mart resisted. Black clergy planned a 
protest strike, facing arrest. They couched the campaign as one for “authentic community” or 
“sustainable community.” A description highlighting racial justice made white workers feel excluded, 
but an organizing tactic that ignored race made Black workers and community members feel the 
movement was unresponsive to their concerns. Protest that enabled a coalition between the white and 
Black communities succeeded. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: 
ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 131–67 (2002); see also Penda 
D. Hair, Prayer and Protest: Bringing a Community Vision of Justice to a Labor Dispute, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & 
EMP. L. 657, 670–73 (2000); Reverend Nelson Johnson, Reflections on an Attempt to Build “Authentic 
Community” in the Greensboro Kmart Labor Struggle, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 675 (2000); Mahoney, Class 
and Status, supra note 35, at 838–39. 
48. Other versions of material discussed infra text accompanying notes 48 through 57 appear 
in Margalynne J. Armstrong & Stephanie M. Wildman, Teaching Race/Teaching Whiteness: Transforming 
Colorblindness to Color Insight, 86 N.C. L. REV. 635 (2008), and Margalynne J. Armstrong & Stephanie 
M. Wildman, Working Across Racial Lines in a Not-So-Post-Racial World, in PRESUMED INCOMPETENT: 
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would be more helpful for everyone to notice when racism is present and to think 
about how to combat it. Society cannot battle a phantom that it fails to recognize 
and name. Whites ignore race at our peril and risk causing unintended harm to 
colleagues of color as the dynamics of racism grind on people of color’s daily lives. 
Race remains a formative identity category that impacts the lives of both 
whites and people of color in different ways. So seeing race for whites must mean 
noticing whiteness, not just noticing race when a person of color is present. The 
dominant value of colorblindness maintains the status quo of white privilege: 
“Colorblindness is the new racism,” as one of our students poignantly said at a 
recent social justice event.49 
To counter the idea of colorblindness or the notion that society is post-
racial,50 co-authors Margalynne and Stephanie have proposed the idea of using 
“color insight.” Color insight provides a vocabulary for teaching across racial 
lines—a lens with which to examine situations and conversations. Color insight 
contrasts with colorblindness and offers an alternative that serves the purported 
goals of colorblindness: racial equality and justice. Color insight recognizes that a 
racial status quo exists in which society attributes race to each member. While 
colorblindness urges us not to notice, color insight says, “Don’t be afraid—notice 
your race and the race of others around you and consider and learn about what 
that means.” Adopting color insight would serve to promote equality and to 
emphasize nondiscrimination among races. Employing color insight would admit 
that most of us do see race and underline the need to understand what that racial 
awareness might mean. 
Establishing an environment in the classroom or workplace in which the 
mention and discussion of race are possible is a key first step.51 If students, 
 
THE INTERSECTIONS OF RACE AND CLASS FOR WOMEN IN ACADEMIA (Gabriella Gutiérrez y Muhs 
et al. eds., 2012). 
49. Benjamin Kuo, then Santa Clara Law student, Comment During Social Justice Thursday 
Discussion at Santa Clara University Law School (Oct. 19, 2006). For a discussion of Social Justice 
Thursday, see Stephanie M. Wildman, Democracy and Social Justice: Founding Centers for Social Justice in Law 
Schools, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 252, 260, 265–66 (2005). 
50. “Post-racial” refers to the notion that America has moved beyond antiquated racial 
stereotypes and now operates, or should operate, both legally and socially, without concern to race. 
Sumi Cho suggests that the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) marked the genesis of the “post-racial” era. Sumi Cho, 
Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1605 (2009). Cho argues that post-racial theory represents a 
“retreat from race” on several fronts. Id. at 1594. Post-racial theory posits that “due to the significant 
racial progress . . . the state need not engage in race-based decision-making or adopt race-based 
remedies, and that civil society should eschew race as a central organizing principle of social action.” 
Id. Thus, post-racialism “rejects the centrality of race as an organizing feature in American society and 
holds that policymakers formulate social and legal remedies best without any consideration of group 
identity, especially racial identity.” Id. at 1603. Kimberlé Crenshaw further notes that “post-racialism 
has become tied to a rhetoric that stigmatizes race-conscious advocacy, social policy and institutional 
critique.” Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to Move 
Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 1327 (2011). 
51. See John O. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the 
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faculty, or colleagues at work can understand how their perception of race may 
have already evolved, they may be more willing to consciously move from 
favoring the notion of colorblindness to supporting color insight. In doing so, 
they can recognize that we all have much to learn from the insights of examining 
race and racialization, as well as socioeconomic class. 
Three key aspects of color insight are: (1) examining systems of privilege, (2) 
unmasking perspectivelessness, and (3) combating stereotyping and looking for 
the “me” in each individual. Examining systems of privilege provides a first step 
toward color insight. Conversations about race in any classroom take place against 
a national backdrop in which race still matters and white privilege continues. Race 
remains a formative identity category that impacts the lives of both whites and 
people of color in different ways. So seeing race for whites must mean noticing 
whiteness, not just noticing race when a person of color is present. 
It is not that whiteness simply privileges white people. Whiteness can also 
negate people of color who are judged by their conformance to white norms, 
disparaged by their perceived dependence on whiteness, or silenced by invisible 
presumptions of nonwhite deviance. Both whites and people of color need to 
recognize their own and each other’s individual privileges. Education, gender, 
sexual orientation, economic wealth, language or accent, physical appearance and 
ability, and religious privileges, to name a few, all continue as societal impediments 
to equality, as does race. 
A second key to color insight is unmasking perspectivelessness. The norms 
and cultural boundaries of legal academics are products of a specific, educationally 
elite subset of the larger society in which their schools operate. Reflecting on these 
societal norms, most law schools would contend that they espouse objectivity and 
neutral principles. Crenshaw critiques this objectivity-neutrality myth, writing:  
In many instances, minority students’ values, beliefs, and experiences 
clash not only with those of their classmates but also with those of their 
professors. Yet because of the dominant view in academe that legal 
 
Intersection of Race, Space and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927, 1927–46 (1999). John Calmore issued 
a call for context in a different setting: 
By issuing a call to context, I am directing attention to the inner-city poor’s lived 
experiences, including the interconnection of legal and non-legal issues they confront, the 
web of experiences within which they live, and what Michael Katz calls “their anchor in 
context.” This suggests that we cannot view their issues or the features of context as fixed 
and unchanging. Instead, we must view them as historically evolving, relational, changing 
in meaning, and, as Katz says, “to be interpreted in terms of time and place.” 
Id. at 1927–28 (footnotes omitted). 
 Examining oppression faced by his clients, Calmore found that it was “group-based, structured, 
and systemic.” Id. at 1938. He deplored the marginalization of his clients that removed them from the 
option of societal participation. He suggested that advocates “search for invitation, opportunity, and 
connection,” urging that “[a]n open mind and a correct sensibility may be more important than the 
command of technical craft, because often we must learn as we go.” Id. at 1956. Similarly, in seeking 
to set institutional and classroom contexts to discuss race and whiteness, we must be willing to learn 
as we go. 
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analysis can be taught without directly addressing conflicts of individual 
values, experiences, and world views, these conflicts seldom, if ever, 
reach the surface of the classroom discussion. Dominant beliefs in the 
objectivity of legal discourse serve to suppress the conflict by discounting 
the relevance of any particular perspective in legal analysis and by 
positing an analytical stance that has no specific cultural, political, or class 
characteristics.52 
This theoretically neutral perspectivelessness perfectly diverts students and 
professors from examining how whiteness and many other factors inform law 
school culture. Perspectivelessness operates through the use of white 
normativeness as the default mode.  
Finally, color insight requires combating stereotyping and looking for the 
“me” in each individual. Jerome Culp, who was an African American law 
professor at Duke, reports on his students asking him, “Where did you go to law 
school?”53 He had realized that this question was a form of the students asking, 
“What gives you the right to teach this course to me?”54 He told them that he had 
attended the University of Chicago and Harvard Law School. Seeking to influence 
the way the students viewed race within his classroom, he also told them he was 
the son of a coal miner. Culp explained that he wanted to say to his Black students 
that “they too can engage in the struggle to reach a position of power and 
influence.”55 He also wanted his white students to see that “[B]lack people have to 
struggle.”56 Yet Culp found that the reaction from students of both races, when he 
told them his history, was often disbelief. He realized that he was facing the 
students’ stereotypes of him and his background. 
Culp explained that his use of autobiography conveyed more than an effort 
to put his students at ease about his qualifications. He wrote: 
My autobiographical statement—I am the son of a poor coal miner—has 
informational content that has a transformative potential much greater 
than my curriculum vitae. Who we are matters as much as what we are and 
what we think. It is important to teach our students that there is a “me” 
in law, as well as specific rules that are animated by our experiences.57 
Culp was combating stereotypes by urging students to see the “me,” the 
individual who transcends those stereotypes and resides at the intersection of 
 
52. Crenshaw, supra note 28, at 34–35 (footnote omitted) (discussing her experiences teaching 
a seminar entitled “Minority Voting Rights and Majoritarian Domination,” which was designed to 
address some of the difficulties encountered by minority law students). 
53. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in 
the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539, 543 (1991) (suggesting that by sharing their lived experiences, 
law professors of color create a safer space for students of color and enhance education for students 
of all races). Sadly, Professor Culp died in 2005. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 539. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 543. 
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multiple identity categories. Culp’s view of the importance of the “me” in law and 
his memorable message about where he came from can inspire us all to teach 
about race and socioeconomic background in the law school classroom. 
So please join us in imagining, if you are a law professor, the following 
hypothetical. If you are a student, please imagine in the hypothetical that you are 
the law student on the last day of class. Or, if you are a practitioner or other 
reader, please imagine that someone you work with in a coalition has made a 
similar statement. For simplicity, this Essay couches the hypothetical to 
professors. 
It is the last day of your class—pick whichever subject you want. You have 
given students a chance to reflect on what they have learned. With two minutes 
left in the whole term, a student raises her hand and says, “I have felt invisible 
throughout this semester. Classroom discussions made assumptions about the 
resources and lifestyles available to clients, lawyers, and law students. I was the 
first in my family to go to college, never mind law school. Sometimes I haven’t 
known where the rent money would come from, and I’ve missed some classes 
because of that. Most of you don’t even know that I am here.” 
What could you have done in your classroom, if anything, to have prevented 
this frustrated outburst? How could you have made sure that the student did not 
feel invisible? Does the student’s gender matter to your answer? Race? Physical 
abledness? Sexual orientation? 
By discussing examples like this one and the issues that are implicated, we 
can make steps toward educating ourselves and future lawyers about “the work we 
know so little about” and becoming better prepared to work with the Maria 
Elenas in our communities. 
 
